ABSTRACT
While all agree that interpretation is central to historical understanding, it is far less clear what its role is. I discuss this question in two steps. First, I clarify the concept by asking what “interpretation” means and when it occurs. Second, I argue for a certain way of conceiving what interpretation aims at and what it achieves. In the first part, I clarify the concept by contrasting it with three supposed opposites: I argue that while interpretation is sometimes opposed to description, the two are inseparable. Next, I contend that despite Nietzsche’s assertion to the contrary, interpretations, and facts are not mutually exclusive categories. I then argue that the distinction between interpretation and explanation is one distinction worth holding onto. Having clarified the concept of interpretation, I turn in the second part of this essay to the nature of this activity. Here the central question is whether historical phenomena admit of only one correct interpretation. I argue, borrowing from Gadamer and others, for a kind of interpretive pluralism according to which historical phenomena admit of a plurality of true interpretations while still allowing us to say that some interpretations are false.
