ABSTRACT
This chapter shows that, to understand Weber’s concept of value judgments (Werturteil) and its practical implications, we must turn to his metaphilosophical thesis of “reference to values” (Werbeziehung). The chapter begins by posing a question that has not yet received the attention it deserves: how should we understand the role of value judgments and to what extent are they acceptable in scientific practice and science policy making? The term “value judgments” is to be understood as referring not only to “practical” evaluation of phenomena but also to their cultural sense. Weber analyzes value judgments on two different levels: (a) the methodological level relating to the choice of the subject matter of scientific inquiry (reference to values, value axioms, ideal types); and (b) the worldview level including the postulate of value freedom (Wertfreiheit) as an assumption of modern science. It would be simplistic to reduce the concept of value judgments to the practical value judgments of scientists (including their ethical standards, political views, or “worldviews”). The dual perspective on value judgments can also be seen in the Weberian category of science as vocation (where it takes the form of internal and external conditions of science) and in his account of the institutionalization of science. Finally, the chapter considers the consequences of this institutionalization and develops the three models of science policy making, including regulative, protective, and integrating policy making.
