ABSTRACT
The first aim of this chapter is that of advancing a novel account in virtue theory - “virtue molecularism” - that presupposes the conceptual, epistemological, and ontological priority of practical wisdom, conceived as skill, over individual virtues. The second aim is to address three potentially fatal challenges to virtue theory developed over the last decades by showing how virtue molecularism can respond to them. More specifically, we will first argue that virtue molecularism can resist the so-called “situationist challenge” better than alternative virtue-theory accounts. Second, we will defend the priority of practical wisdom from the “anti-rationalist challenge” by dismantling the obsolete dualistic picture of the mind upon which this challenge relies. Finally, we will contend that, by conceiving of practical wisdom as a skill or expertise, virtue molecularism is immune to the “automaticity challenge,” which instead is effective against more traditional skill-based accounts of the individual virtues.
