ABSTRACT
Wisdom has typically a practical and problem-solving nature, therefore it is essential for understanding moral acts, which are very seldom black-and-white. Dealing with the situation hic et nunc, practical wisdom focuses, on the one hand, on the “particular” by adapting the general ethical rule to the concrete situations. On the other hand, however, it uses the limited information available in a given context and under given rules to judge the situation as a whole. While the first direction is particularizing, the second is generalizing, and also this “situated generalization” can be seen as a dimension of practical wisdom. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate and value both directions, as necessary and realistic features of this virtue. At the same time, it will empirically explain how a generalizing process may also lead to dogmatic and discriminating perspectives, so losing its virtuous character. We designed an experimental investigation asking participants to evaluate the moral values of fictional characters and unknown people, after being administered nonmoral information about them (e.g., basing their judgment on aesthetical appearance, emotions, and information about nonmoral issues). Results show how these kinds of nonmoral information can affect moral. Shall we conclude that if one is wise does not generalize? Actually, recognizing and handling the potentials and limits of the generalization process is precisely what makes wisdom virtuous.
