ABSTRACT
The conclusion discusses the unexpected result of this volume’s chapters. In the 18th century, “reform” was for a long time not promoted as the intentional and systematic overcoming of long-established deficiencies. Rather, it was conceived traditionally as the restoration of an earlier, unadulterated state. Even Montesquieu, who understood “reform” as legislative shaping of the future, recommended respecting as much as possible the existing customs. Tradition should not, at least not visibly, be substituted by the sovereign’s will, which risked association with absolutism or despotism. “Improvement” was a term that sounded less threatening in the ears of subjects who, however, remained suspicious of this being just a pretext for extending state power. The glorification of the past and reservations against “innovation”, which was associated with centralised power, were arguably even more important in republics than in monarchies, as the example of Venice suggests. Rational models from other areas of the world or from utopias took a long time until they were accepted. Only when, after 1789, authors like Burke clearly distinguished violent “revolution” and “reform”, the latter became the appropriate reaction to inevitable historical change, on condition that it was based on and backed by public debate.
