ABSTRACT
When scholars attempt to find ancient traces of the Molyneux problem, and of the Lockean epistemological perspective in which the problem is inscribed, they almost always refer to Aristotle and, less frequently, to Cicero and the Stoics. According to Aristotle, there are sensible objects that belong exclusively to one organ of sense and common sensibles, perceptible by more than one sense. This is the background to the Molyneux question and is, in a way, its presupposition. If Locke had not been a strong critic of innate ideas, if he had not conceived the mind before experience as a tabula rasa, the problem of Molyneux would not arise. Despite the obvious differences due to the different historical-philosophical contexts to which they belong, it is useful to compare the “empiricisms” of the two philosophers to better understand the specificity of Locke’s empiricism and the theories that constitute it and that eventually differentiate it from Epicurus’.
