ABSTRACT
William Molyneux’s question, which originated in the seventeenth century, asks whether someone born blind, who could identify objects through touch, could recognize these objects if their sight was restored and they saw these objects for the first time. Both Molyneux and Locke, in line with his empirical views and his epistemic modesty, answer the question in the negative; the newly sighted person would fail at cross-modal recognition. Exploring Masham’s writings within the context of Molyneux’s question provides a unique insight into Masham’s philosophy of mind, her views of perception, and the roles of reason and experience in our understanding of the world. It is more worthwhile, for her, to pursue the practical and moral ends of these philosophical speculations than to get involved in the minute details of the speculation itself. Nevertheless, there are some reasons to think Molyneux’s question might have interested her had she the leisure and opportunity to engage in such intellectual pursuits.
