ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I argue that Henri Bergson is a naïve realist about perception. I begin by explaining what naïve realism means in the contemporary philosophy of perception, distinguishing between weak naïve realism and strong naïve realism. In Section 13.1, I note that naïve realism so defined is very different from the view that Bergson himself calls naïve realism, and which he clearly rejects. In Section 13.2, I introduce Bergson’s distinction between concrete perception and pure perception, and raise some doubts as to whether Bergson could be a naïve realist about pure perception. In Section 13.3, I gather evidence that Bergson is at least a weak naïve realist about concrete perception, and, in Section 13.4, I argue that he is also a strong naïve realist about concrete perception, by considering his views about the contributions to perception of affection and memory.
