ABSTRACT
My aim in this paper is to present Bergson’s critique of possibility. In service of this purpose, I shall also touch on related concepts, such as nothingness and truth. Among such concepts, that of virtuality deserves special attention, since Deleuze, one of the most influential Bergson commentators, made this notion a basis of his interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy, measuring this notion against that of possibility. With respect to the concept of virtuality, Deleuze asserts that Bergson (a) formulates it in a peculiar way and (b) puts it at the heart of his philosophy. In the first part of this paper, we shall see that these claims are largely inaccurate. Concerning possibility, Deleuze contends that Bergson (c) criticises the concept, (d) proposes applying it only to things which lack radical novelty, and (e) considers it to be the origin of all kinds of pseudo-problems. In the second part, I will examine Bergson’s critique of this concept and conclude that while (c) is true, (d) and (e) require major revisions. Lastly, I suggest that the point Deleuze tries to make with the concept of virtuality is better made with a different conception of possibility.
