ABSTRACT
When Bergson tells us that conscious processes are “indivisible”, or that experiences “mutually penetrate” one another, or consist of “successions without juxtaposition”, it is not always obvious what he means. Are these characterizations merely suggestive but vague metaphors? Or do they correspond to deep truths concerning the character of our consciousness? In this chapter I develop a case for the latter possibility. I start off by looking at the synchronic unity of consciousness. I suggest that this mode of unity is sui generis and irreducible by virtue of not being explainable in other terms, and that this is (in part at least) what Bergson meant when characterizing durée as indivisible. I then move on to consider the temporal character of consciousness. Contemporary “extensional” theorists hold that experiences of change unfold over intervals of time, and possess contents that are irreducibly dynamic. I suggest that there are reasons for supposing that Bergson was committed to a broadly similar position. In the final two sections, I explore the issue of inter-experiential interdependence, focusing on Bergson’s suggestion concerning the dependence of the qualitative character of each of the parts of an instance of durée on the qualitative character of the other parts.
