ABSTRACT
Newton’s famous Hypotheses non fingo raises many questions. While he castigated the Cartesians for their vortex hypothesis, and his follower Cotes attacked mechanical chemistry, Newton himself ventured many hypotheses, notably in his Opticks, the Queries to the Opticks and in the last book of the Principia. Although it is true that Newton, unlike Descartes, fit his data to mathematical models, what he said about hypotheses seems straightforwardly false. To explain this situation, Wilson explores the web of associations between Cartesianism, hypotheses, ‘speculation’ and ‘vain philosophy’ in the Pauline sense. She shows how Cartesian hypotheses concerning the origins of the world were understood as dangerously pagan, and how Newton and his supporters took pains to distinguish their brand of science from his by denying that they were engaged in any form of speculative or ‘vain’ philosophy.
