ABSTRACT
In Section 10.2, I introduce some assumptions that clarify the focus of the paper: I present different kinds of doxastic disagreements and specify on which kind of disagreement I concentrate. In Section 10.3, I make some idealizing assumptions and introduce the Standard Method of Aggregation, which builds on Standard Bayesianism. I end the section by presenting two challenges to the Standard Method of Aggregation: one concerning the fact that the method does not respect the evidential states of agents, and the other that the method cannot account for synergetic effects. In Section 10.4, I propose Dyadic Bayesianism as an alternative to Standard Bayesianism. I compare it with Levi’s framework for representing epistemic states, to which it can be traced, yet from which it slightly differs. The comparison will help provide a better understanding of Dyadic Bayesianism. Building on Dyadic Bayesianism, I propose the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation as a means of providing an answer to the Main Question, and I discuss the challenges to the Standard Method of Aggregation in relation to the Fine-Grained Method of Aggregation. Finally, I summarize my results in Section 10.5.
