ABSTRACT
In this chapter I argue that we cannot afford to pretend that we occupy the fictional ‘view from nowhere,’ or that those of us who remain uninvested and disinterested in the answers to particular philosophical puzzles manage to draw closer to it than others. In the first two sections I sketch the dangers of attempting to do analytic philosophy of religion from this fictional perspective. I argue that it creates gaps in our collective knowledge—what Kristie Dotson calls ‘reliable ignorance.’ When embraced, reinforced, and then encoded in the structures and practices of the discipline, this ignorance becomes pernicious. It is pernicious in at least two respects. First, it distorts the results of our philosophical inquiry. Our theories end up incomplete at best, and false or positively harmful at worst. Second, though related, it does epistemic violence to members and would-be members of our philosophical community. Failing to see certain people as knowers, we quiet their testimony or encourage them to smother it themselves. In the third section I gesture towards some attitudes and practices that would help move analytic philosophy of religion toward greater epistemic justice, allowing more of us to practice philosophy with our whole selves.
