ABSTRACT
I connect recent work in feminist epistemology to the philosophy of religion. In particular, I apply the concept of epistemic injustice to reports, and the subsequent epistemic evaluation, of religious experience. I argue those who report and hence testify about their experiences of intuitive knowing are sometimes subject to epistemic injustice. Their testimony is often unfairly downgraded because of prior considerations (or philosophical assumptions) which have nothing to do with the speaker’s epistemic reliability as a testifier. As the West increasingly understands itself in naturalistic terms it’s also possible that hermeneutical injustice sometimes occurs with respect to (possible) experiences of intuitive knowing. For instance, someone who understands the world in (mostly) naturalistic terms may lack the conceptual resources to fully understand and explain what she’s experienced. I conclude by tentatively suggesting that if testifiers about religious experience were not subject to epistemic injustice, there would be more reason to take such experiences as a source of significant information and evidence about religion.
