ABSTRACT
This chapter evaluates six arguments for the claim that if theism is true, then animal universalism, the view that all non-human animals with interests will eventually receive eternal, infinitely good afterlives, is also true. One argument is original to me, while the others have been defended elsewhere. I find some of these arguments unsatisfactory, but claim that others are compelling, or can be modified in ways which make them compelling. I conclude that the compelling arguments together provide a very strong case for animal universalism. One recurring theme in the discussion is that the literature on animal universalism must pay more attention to the diversity among non-human animals: some of the arguments I discuss fail to establish animal universalism because they appeal to features which may only be possessed by some non-human animals. This represents an affinity with my earlier work, where I claimed that philosophers of religion working on the problem of evil must likewise pay more attention to the diversity among non-human animals.
