ABSTRACT
The objective of this article is to shed light on how Rousseau’s autobiographical writings – not only the Confessions, but also the Dialogues and the Rêveries – bring out the peculiar conception of his philosophy of truth, which, far from counterpoising itself to the philosopher’s autobiographical narrative, finds in it its preferred means of expression. The point of departure for the analysis is the fourth Promenade in the Rêveries. In addition to presenting an important taxonomy of lies, this work takes shape ‘negatively’ – that is, through a defensive attitude from Rousseau – a true theory of autobiographical fiction. At the heart of this theory is an unprecedented distinction within the notion of truth. Alongside effectual truth, exalted by other philosophes and inevitably opposed to fiction, is a moral truth. The autobiographical narrative represents Jean-Jacques’ preferred means of access with respect to the second type, which the philosopher dedicated his entire existence studying – as indicated by his favourite motto, vitam impendere vero. Here resides the intrinsic philosophical dimension of autobiographical narration: in it fiction does not only give access to truth, but has the function of constructing it.
