ABSTRACT
This chapter paints a rather bleak picture of the strategic and nuclear landscape. In an era of “nuclear nationalism,” most nuclear powers are expanding their arsenals; those of Asian countries are slowly coming to a point of maturation. There is still a nuclear order: proliferation is contained, weapons are controlled, and the tradition of non-use appears strong. But this order is fragile and increasingly challenged from within and from without. The chances of bridging the gap between “deterrers” and “disarmers,” despite a common overarching goal of preventing nuclear war, remain lather slim. The ratification of the Ban Treaty by a large number of countries would not make it easier. Absent an unexpected scientific and technical revolution in the coming two or three decades, nuclear deterrence is likely to remain a backbone of international security by the time we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki––although missile defense and long-range precision strikes will increasingly be part of the picture. Eight scenarios of “radical departures from the status quo” are presented.
