ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews the linkages between the existential and social moral philosophers; however, a full examination of the existential moral philosopher must await another occasion. Assumptions, conversely, are usually taken-for-granted norms that are tacitly accepted but not consciously used in inquiries. Moral inquiry’s first regulative assumption is that people are committed to a plurality of moral ideals that provide their lives with significance. James states that the moral philosopher rejects ethical skepticism at the outset of moral inquiry. Ethical skepticism is, for James, not a position within moral philosophy but rather a “residual alternative to all philosophy”. Moral inquiry is simply the more reflective development of what moral agents must do when those practices fail them, particularly when the ideals embedded in them come into conflict. The Inclusivity Ideal is best understood as second-order regulative ideal which is intended to govern a wide field of first-order ideals and demands.
