ABSTRACT
Rebecca Comay's interpretation of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit reads it as a piece of trauma work. The trauma is the French Revolution. This approach, referring mainly to the second part of the Phenomenology, the part on Spirit, helps a lot to overcome the reduction of Hegel's thought to Sellarsian pragmatist epistemology, as it has been dominant since Robert Pippin's seminal analysis. The chapter reconstructs Comay's interpretation in contrast to the dominant reading and underlines the importance of the revolution for the conception of Spirit. It criticizes, however, Comay's blindness regarding Absolute Knowledge. Absolute Knowledge is the end of Hegel's Phenomenology. Only here do the precedent steps of argument acquire their adequate meaning. As much as Comay's interpretation overcomes the shortcomings of pragmatist readings, as much does it share with them the restriction of philosophy to contingency. The chapter ends with a sketch of an alternative perspective.
