ABSTRACT
The process of reform in Hungary had its basis in the 1956 revolution. The crushing of that revolution by the Soviet Union taught the country's new, Moscow-installed leaders and, to a lesser extent, most Hungarians two lessons. The trauma of 1956 was a necessary but insufficient precondition tor Kadar's reformist course. Its implementation was made possible by additional circumstances. The reforms were also made possible by Kadar's ability to focus on long-term goals and by his considerable political skills. By the mid-1980s, the collectives owned more than two-thirds of Hungary's arable land, although their output was only about half of the total. The contribution of state farms to the total output was 15.3 percent; of the household farms, 18.4 percent; and of auxiliary and private farms, 15.2 percent. In industry, the New Economic Mechanism, which was formally inaugurated in 1968, began to modify, although it did not radically change, Hungary's command economy.
