ABSTRACT
The Guatemalan case is illustrative of the linkages among the various strategic variables. For the greater part of the 1960s Guatemala was subjected to a revolutionary insurgency aimed at changing political values and structures and transforming the economic and social order. In November 1962 a separate group of insurgents attempted to establish a guerrilla front in the department of Huehuetenango in western Guatemala. In summation, it must be said that the Guatemalan government took strong, decisive action beginning in mid-1966 and that it adjusted its strategy as the insurgents varied theirs. The insurgents, however, reorganized themselves in their new urban environment, and from 1967 to 1970 staged a very active campaign of urban terrorism. The insurgents' decision in 1967 to shift most of their operations to the urban environment called for some modifications in the government's strategy and tactics. The size of the country was certainly adequate to give the insurgents room in which to operate.
