ABSTRACT
In 1945, even before the Japanese surrender, Ho Chi Minh began to develop a regular army for the newly constituted Communist Vietminh government. The inferiority of the Vietminh forces was very quickly revealed, and by spring 1947, Vietminh government and the remnants of its army fled to the mountainous area north of Hanoi. The inability of the Vietminh to achieve a quick victory, followed by the French failure to annihilate the Communist forces, indicated that a long war was likely. The war of movement, as Vietminh leaders conceived it, was characterized chiefly by the absence of fixed fronts and rear areas, quick concentration for action, and immediate disengagement after fighting. For 1949, reports of meetings and speeches by Vietminh leaders permit to form a more precise idea of the emerging strategy. At a military congress in mid-May, top military leaders expounded the doctrine of the protracted war and stated at which stage they considered the war in Indochina to be.
