ABSTRACT
Captured Vietminh documents have brought to light painstaking intelligence surveys of French troop dispositions, habits, and activities, which obviously served the Vietminh as a very good planning base for their operations. One intelligence study prepared by the Vietminh for their northwestern operations in 1952 impressed the French greatly by its scope as well as by the detail and accuracy of the information. The French had discovered the location of the command post of Nguyen Binh, the Viet commander of Cochinchina, and mounted a land and air operation with the objective of seizing or killing him and his staff. A propaganda instruction to the troops that were to invade Laos in 1953 reflects the main themes of Vietminh propaganda directed toward inhabitants of the mountain areas. The Vietminh were careful, also, to anticipate strong enemy reactions and counterattacks. The Vietminh tried to paralyze the French by denying them the use of roads, paths, and waterways.
