ABSTRACT
This chapter explains what has happened in Sino-Soviet relations. It focuses on the role of peripheral middle powers in the relationship, notably Vietnam and Mongolia. The chapter examines the causes of the limited Sino-Soviet detente as well as its extent, direction, limits, and likely duration. With an interruption caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, negotiations at the deputy foreign minister level have been going on intermittently between Moscow and Peking. The post-1979 Chinese response to the often-repeated Soviet offers for negotiation may best be seen as the second act in the Chinese response to the Soviet challenge to China after the Sino-Soviet break. The first was Mao Zedong’s decision in 1969 to draw the logical consequence from the rising Soviet military buildup and hostility: to improve relations with the United States. Soviet policy toward the People’s Republic of China seems compounded out of two only apparently contradictory frames of mind: arrogant strength and fear caused by perceived weakness.
