ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses methods of control in the military command system when U. S. forces are employed in crises and introduces the concept of indirect control. It examines US naval operations in the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in order to assess the crisis management implications of indirect control. The degree of centralization in the control of military operations has long been a major issue in American civil-military relations and the design of the US military command system. In positive control, communications with operational forces are used to control their actions on a real-time basis. Positive control allows subordinate commanders the least amount of initiative and flexibility: movements and actions are taken only on direct orders. Mechanisms of indirect control are orders or guidance issued to commanders prior to missions to ensure that their operational decisions support the intentions of superiors.
