ABSTRACT
Most decision analyses are exceedingly synchronic. In the case of the 1973 decisions, one cannot escape the weight of historical factors, whether related to the belief in "one Arab nation from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arab Gulf," or the establishment of the state of Israel as an "imperialist base" in the area. Saudi Arabia, though underdeveloped, Islamic, and Arab, had a decision context quite different from Egypt's. An Egypt under relentlessly increasing economic strain henceforth expected substantial and continuing access to the growing riches of the oil states. Saudi Arabia prides herself on being the birth place of both Arab culture and Islam and the protector of their purity. Until at least 1975, the systematic analysis of foreign policy of Arab-Islamic countries was rare in quantity and modest in quality. The decision's "suicidal" aspect seemed confirmed when Israel's Chief of Staff declared that his army would chase the attacking forces back to their initial bases to "crush their bones."
