ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the kinds of events that could trigger unintended escalation as well as some of the decisionmaking factors that make subsequent escalation more likely. It discusses measures for improving US-Soviet decisionmaking in crisis, both those that exist and additional ones that might be valuable. Most experts agree that the most likely path to a nuclear war lies neither in a calculated launching of a general nuclear war independent of any crisis, nor in a deliberate Soviet invasion of Western Europe. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was one occasion when the superpowers appeared to come perilously close to nuclear war. Three generic triggers of a crisis that might lead to an unintended nuclear war may be usefully distinguished: regional conflicts, inadvertent encounters between deployed US and Soviet forces, and "bizarre" nuclear detonations. The escalation of regional conflicts, inadvertent encounters between US and Soviet systems, and bizarre detonations are three broad types of potential risks.
