ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on technical methods to verify compliance with the rules governing a nuclear-weapon-free world. Actual uncertainties in accessible existing quantities of special nuclear materials, as they would apply to verification authorities, could be much larger than the inherent uncertainties. The ultimate objectives of verification procedures in a nuclear-weapon-free world will be to assure that no nuclear warheads, undisclosed nuclear materials, or undisclosed facilities for their production exist, and that there is no unauthorized removal of materials or equipment from any disclosed facilities. Verified elimination of nuclear warheads under future treaties or bilateral arrangements short of formal treaties has been a subject of several studies. The highly enriched uranium removed from the warheads can be rendered incapable of sustaining an explosive chain reaction by diluting it with natural or depleted uranium. Official, actual uncertainties in the disposition of military special nuclear materials produced in the United States correspond to several tens of thousands of kilogrammes.
