ABSTRACT
The advent of political party control over the jihad essentially coincided with the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan to bolster its disintegrating client regime. The vigorous and successful resistance of the Afghan people to the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul did not begin with the December 1979 invasion. Rather, it assumed significant proportions following the April 1978 Marxist coup. The real significance of the change of leaders in Kabul had little to do with Afghanistan and much to do with Soviet-American relations. Taraki's jirgahs were an example of the cautious 'realpolitik' of a leader fully cognizant of the autonomous heritage of the Pushtun tribes and their instinctive wariness toward whichever group ruled in Kabul. As the magnitude of the popular revolt became apparent to the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan leaders in Kabul, their response was to fall back on the time-worn strategy of trying to rally the tribes by calling forth the foreign threat.
