ABSTRACT
North Korea suffers from the ills of the Stalinist economic strategy, still operating in a relatively pure form. This chapter aims to identify both the incentives and the disincentives for forward movement in Democratic People's Republic of Korea-Republic of Korea (DPRK-ROK) relations, including agreement on arms reductions. It is logical to assume that the DPRK would be wise to have a new, more forward-looking policy in place before Kim Il-sung passes from the scene, while control is still firm. The DPRK leadership regards Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates as traitors to socialism and betrayers of North Korea. DPRK policies are likely to be parallel in character, roughly equivalent to the old Chinese Communist tactics of "talk, talk-fight, fight," combining government-to-government negotiations with united front efforts. US policies should become flexible with respect to the attendance of North Koreans at conferences and workshops, while making it clear that progress in US-DPRK relations will be tied to advances in the DPRK-ROK dialogue.
