ABSTRACT
One of the major self-imposed aberrations of strategic theory in the last four decades has been the assumption that pure nuclear deterrence exists. In fact, nuclear strategy and forces have always been intertwined with conventional forces and contingency planning. In contrast to the theoretical models of strategic stability, in reality nuclear war-planning, strategic forces, tactical nuclear and conventional forces are all intertwined. The omnipotence of strategic nuclear power, especially that of intercontinental ballistic missiles and SLBMs, the stringent limits on ballistic missile defenses placed by the 1972 ABM Treaty and the 1974 protocol, and the low effectiveness of traditional ABM technologies made it possible to ignore strategic-conventional interactions in strategic modelling and arms control negotiations. Technological development with few exceptions always imposed its logic on the arms race and arms control. Strategic nuclear, strategic conventional, and theater nuclear and conventional levels of stability will become inseparable in the future.
