ABSTRACT
The Soviet military went into Afghanistan in 1978-79 following policies and worldviews that then seemed compelling in Moscow. In 1989-1991, however, Gorbachev presided over a limited liability commitment in Afghanistan, with diplomatic support, military advisers, a limited combat role, and extensive military and economic aid for their clients in Kabul. The several factors of the Manwaring low-intensity conflict paradigm are valid and effective for understanding the war in Afghanistan and can be applied to all the participants. Afghanistan showed the importance of meeting expectations and demonstrating competence to establish legitimacy. The grounds for legitimacy in Afghanistan were greatly influenced by the combination of superpower involvement and limited modernization. Afghanistan confirms that although foreign military involvement can be a lifesaver, it often comes with a high cost in legitimacy. Changing the Soviets' intervention from one of direct participation to limited liability made Afghanistan a different war, but their involvement continued up to the end of the Soviet Union.
