ABSTRACT
Conventional wisdom argues that as the superpower contest recedes Washington will have more latitude for selecting the regions where it will concentrate and the Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) crises with which it will deal. The very nature of LIC keeps the overall stakes low, camouflages the emergence of problems, and gives politicians lots of reasons to procrastinate before taking action. Once the decision makers and the public are more sensitized to the character of the LIC challenge and more basic organizational adjustments are put in place, the government's ability to respond mechanically should improve. There is little quarrel among the commentators that LIC operations put especially heavy demands on the United States (US). Historically, the fortunes of LIC in US strategy and national policy travel along a predictable cycle. The services finally must shed the belief that the techniques of conventional, mid- to high-intensity war are applicable to all forms of LIC.
