ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the roots and character of the insurgency from 1972 to 1982; the major changes in the counterinsurgency strategy after the 23 March 1982 coup. It describes Max Manwaring's several criteria for successful counterinsurgency as applied to the Guatemala case; and the lessons to learn from a government that "went it alone" in a war against a guerrilla insurgency. President Jacobo Arbenz instituted domestic and foreign policies that Guatemalan conservatives and officials in the Eisenhower administration viewed as dangerously radical and leftist. In November 1966, the Guatemalan army began major counterinsurgency operations in Zacapa. As Guatemala moved toward the 1982 presidential elections, the government's domestic and international support continued to deteriorate. In July 1982, the stage was set for the determining confrontation between the military and a Marxist-led, Indian-based insurgency in Guatemala's highlands. The military zones where the insurgency was being fought underwent changes in command structure and personnel.
