ABSTRACT
From the Soviet point of view, the strategic decision of the early 1950s to support the Arab side against Israel appeared to retain its political validity, despite a steady erosion of Soviet influence in the Arab camp after Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death. From Israel’s point of view, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was seen as an implacable foe of the Zionist state, motivated by considerations of makhtpolitik supplemented by a visceral anti-semitism that honed the edge of whatever rational factors might be turning the course of Soviet policy against Israel. The Soviet formulation is, in effect, a near-verbatim repetition of statements at the Arab Summit meetings. For Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and his intern ational policies, the worst case scenario would be a renewed state of active war between the Arab states and Israel. Shevardnadze pressed conceitedly for some small concession on a conference that would negotiate an Arab-Israeli settlement on the possible basis of “territory for peace.”.
