ABSTRACT
The defense industrialists have reason to be vitally concerned with decisions affecting the Soviet regime's current policy of detente toward the West, particularly decisions relating to the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) and the importing of Western technology. The limited nature of the evidence available to resolve the question of managerial power in the defense sector is readily apparent from a survey of the published information on the defense industrialists' domain. Notwithstanding the durability of the defense industrialists, there have been several organizational changes within the sector since it first attained separate existence almost forty years ago. Differences between designers and service personnel, on the one hand, and top defense industrialists, on the other, might be particularly discernible in the case of technologically adventurous weapon programs. The top defense industrialists may also be afraid that acceptance of technologically adventurous weapons systems might entangle them in new dependencies, even if they manage to avoid large-scale reorganizations.
