ABSTRACT
Economic modernization became the primary domestic goal, requiring accommodation to international norms in foreign policy. In August Foreign Minister Qian made a whirlwind tour of Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique, where he touted China’s support for “serious North-South talks” on changing “the unreasonable international economic order and settlement of the African debt issue.” The constant caveats against foreign influence and plots of “peaceful evolution” allegedly promoted through foreign contact coexisted with assertions that the “open” policy must continue. As China’s oligarchy of octogenarians reflected on the 40th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1989, the few remaining revolutionary leaders could feel proud of their record in foreign relations. China’s self-proclaimed point of identity, did the PRC leadership enjoy continued acceptance, deliberately demonstrated by high-level visits and exchanges. At home Chinese media proclaimed defiant confidence in fighting off foreign influence and prevailing over economic sanctions.
