ABSTRACT
The manner in which both superpowers perceived their core and secondary interests in the Middle East has had a clear impact on their management of the region’s crises. Although the superpowers’ interests in the Middle East have generally been consistent during the post-World War II period, management of the region’s crises varied in terms of policies, positions and bargaining tactics. In managing the 1973 crisis, the superpowers resorted to the whole spectrum of crisis-bargaining tactics ranging from persuasion to accommodation, cooperation and/or coercion. Both superpowers practiced mutual self-restraint to prevent Arab-Israeli crises from driving them into direct confrontation. Outside the Arab-Israeli area, the U.S.S.R. seems to understand the intensity of American interest the Middle East, particularly its concern with Persian Gulf Oil. The Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces.
