ABSTRACT
The critical components responsible for the successful culmination of Soviet policy in the May 1989 summit lay in a much broader context than Sino-Soviet relations. Lest one suspect the author of hubris in assuming a ready ability to determine the degree of "learning" in Soviet policy toward China during the period 1969-1988, several formidable obstacles and limitations must be acknowledged at the outset. Charles E. Bohlen's uncertainty about a question on which he witnessed so much interaction at the highest level cautions against academic inferences at long distance over the more elusive question of Soviet policy toward China. The leitmotif of Soviet statements throughout the spring focused on "nationalism" as a key ingredient in Chinese behavior, extending its manifestations back to Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yuxiang in the 1920s and culminating as "the alpha and the omega" of Maoism.
