ABSTRACT
In the context of the Indian Ocean, the arms/arms control dichotomy is too narrow; quite possibly, neither arms control, nor local forces and facilities, nor both, may provide an adequate foundation on which to base US policy toward the area. The potential scope of arms control is only partially illustrated by examining the precedents in the area of naval arms control. The first and probably most successful arrangement affecting naval forces was the 1817 Executive Agreement between the United States and Great Britain governing the militarization of the Great Lakes. The period of executive branch resistance to Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Treaty abruptly ended with the inauguration of Jimmy Carter, who from the outset placed a surprising degree of emphasis on the need to pursue formal arms control in the Indian Ocean. More specifically, on numerous occasions President Carter referred to either the complete "demilitarization" of the ocean or, more modestly, some degree of mutual Soviet-American military restraint.
