ABSTRACT
If we must wait for such universal consensus before undertaking to work out a program of nonproliferation, we are doomed from the start. We are not compelled to base such a program on any particular set of value judgments. Properly, however, safeguards have never been conceived to be either foolproof or worthless. Combined with other measures, they are integral to any approach toward the goal of nonproliferation. Qualified countries are those for whom the cost of meaningful nuclear armament is very high, and for whom the price—political or otherwise—of violating the nonproliferation pledge is also very high. Countries already in possession of nuclear explosives do not automatically qualify; in that regard, we need consider only the cases of China and India. All of the current discussion of nonproliferation, either within or outside the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation framework, along with all the good and sensible proposals to realize our mutual objectives, may end up being just so many good ideas.
