ABSTRACT
The use of drones to kill suspected militants seems to provide a simple technical fix to a complex ethico-political problem: the need to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. The technological ability of drones, combined with the rhetorical commitment to reducing civilian casualties, suggests that the principle of noncombatant immunity is firmly entrenched in debates about targeted killings. However, this article will argue that a peculiar effect of this enhanced technological capability has been to draw attention to the conceptual confusion that surrounds the distinction. Rather than assuming that it is a fixed feature of international law, I will argue that it should be viewed as a discursive formation that is contingent upon a precarious process of repetition and reiteration. Moreover, I will show how the laws designed to restrain the violence inflicted on civilian bodies have been invoked to render certain civilians vulnerable, constituting them as killable, their lives profoundly losable.
