ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses Kierkegaard’s treatment of mimesis in his authorship. I identify three interpretative lenses used to analyse mimesis in Kierkegaard in the relevant literature, before moving on to consider some problems that plague each of them. I focus on a reading of mimesis that is limited to one of its facets, namely imitation. I then demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s insistence on a plurality of prototypes of authentic Christian existence forces us to think differently about the relation between the imitator and its model(s). Lastly, I contribute my own conceptualization of mimesis in Kierkegaard that accommodates both the identified problems in the relevant scholarship and Kierkegaard’s insistence on a plurality of prototypes. I call this type of mimesis ‘existential,’ and characterize it as indirect, intention-oriented, ‘non-comparing,’ and concerned with ends rather than means.
