ABSTRACT
The critical situation in which Alexios Komnenos found himself soon after his ascension to the imperial throne of Byzantium and his first steps to consolidate his power internally and externally does need not to be reiterated here in full. The battle readiness and battle worthiness of the Byzantine army under his command had severe repercussions: modern estimates envision casualty rates as high as 25%. Another most obvious option – that is, to hire mercenary units with the same style of warfare as of the Normans form the south of Italy – was no less impossible to materialize in the tight time frame within which the Byzantine emperor was unwillingly operating. Since 1083, the composition of the Byzantine army under Alexios Komnenos underwent significant alterations. Of course, this process was a direct effect of the losses that the army had suffered since 1081, which depleted the strength of the “conventional” Byzantine cavalry and infantry tagmata.
