ABSTRACT
In fact, Elie During suggests that Bergson’s problematic philosophy provides the grounds for the “non-positivist conception of problems” developed by proponents of the “French epistemological tradition”. This chapter discusses Bergson’s demand for “precision” in philosophy and the equivalence he draws between properly stating and solving problems. It explores what Bergson refers to as “fictitious,” “phantom” or “pseudo-problems” – false problems, in his view, that have plagued the history of philosophy. before going on to explore what Bergson refers to as “fictitious,” “phantom” or “pseudo-problems” – false problems, in his view, that have plagued the history of philosophy. The chapter returns to the interrelation of Bergson’s “problematic” metaphysics and methodology, providing further detail and illustrations of its negative and positive aspects. It examines how Bergson tackles the issue of false problems, or what he otherwise calls “fictitious,” “phantom” and “pseudo-” problems.
