ABSTRACT
Unlike other ways of coming to act, for example as a result of habit or impulse, practical reasoning imprints our actions with the distinctive mark of rational full-blooded agency. This entry enquires into what practical reasoning consists in. First, we lay out four basic criteria—mentality, evaluation, practicality, attributability—that adequate accounts of practical reasoning ought to satisfy in order to capture essential features of the phenomenon. Specifically, practical deliberation is a by and large conscious mental process answerable to a range of evaluative standards. Moreover, this process is aimed at settling what to do. Lastly, reasoning does not merely occur to the practical reasoner but is instead something that she does. We then turn to John Broome’s influential account of reasoning which satisfies the aforementioned criteria. On his view, practical reasoning is the rule-guided activity by which we bring our mental attitudes (especially our intentions) to satisfy requirements of practical rationality. We then focus on three challenges to Broome’s account that have been the topic of recent debate. First, we discuss the role that autobiographical considerations of the sort ‘I’d like to φ’ or ‘I intend to φ’ might play in practical reasoning. Broome, perhaps, is wrong in giving them very little place. Second, we discuss Jonathan Dancy’s proposal that practical reasoning does not conclude in the formation of intentions but in action. Third, we consider whether assessments of rationality can come in degrees and why we should care about satisfying rational requirements in the first place.
