ABSTRACT
Husserl presents his mature phenomenology as an eidetic science of transcendental consciousness. In so doing he invokes two levels of “purity” in the phenomenological analysis: the purity of essences as opposed to facts and the purity of transcendental lived experiences [Erlebnisse] as opposed to naturalistically interpreted mental states. The purity of essences is achieved through the eidetic reduction and the purity of transcendental lived experiences is achieved through the phenomenological reduction. While Husserl often presents the two reductions as mutually independent, the early reception of Husserl’s Ideas I shows that the relationship between them is more complicated. In this chapter I will discuss essays by Steinmann, Elsenhans, Linke, and Stein, who, between 1915 and 1918 engaged in an illuminating, yet unfinished controversy on this important issue. I will attempt to “end” the controversy by suggesting that the transcendental dimension and the eidetic dimension of phenomenology are jointly necessary for Husserl’s project. Eidetic phenomenology needs transcendental phenomenology in order to clarify the ontological status of essences, and transcendental phenomenology needs eidetic phenomenology in order to be at all able to speak about lived experiences. If this is correct, then the repeated attempts in post-Husserlian phenomenology to dispense with either the phenomenological or the eidetic reduction are ultimately problematic and the two methods should be considered part of one package.
