ABSTRACT
Phenomenology’s aims as a science and its proper scientific results of its investigations are descriptive propositions of a certain type. They are general non-empirical propositions that have the character of laws and are named eidetic laws (Wesensgesetze) by Husserl, more precisely, descriptive eidetic laws. Directed towards descriptive eidetic laws as the scientific results of Husserlian phenomenology, I first delineate Husserl’s general concept of description. Based on that, I elucidate what eidetic descriptions are, and in so doing, I explicate Husserl’s concept of a descriptive eidetic law as a pure law built on pure concepts. In order to demonstrate what specific phenomenological eidetic descriptions are, I explicate reflective descriptions that thematize the subjective in its essential dimensions (ego, cogito, and cogitatum qua cogitatum), and then what purely reflective descriptions are. Only purely reflective descriptions, which thematize the subjective by means of the phenomenological epoché and which have the form of descriptive eidetic laws, are scientific descriptions which are phenomenological descriptions in the specific sense. They are characterized by a double purity: They are pure as eidetic descriptions and they are pure as purely reflective descriptions.
