ABSTRACT
The chapter’s main goal is to argue that Husserl’s notion of (conscious) intentionality is not only the core of his oeuvre, but also that it is still philosophically valuable. In order to do so, my discussion revolves around three W-questions: (1) The Why-Question: why does intentionality matter philosophically? (2) The What-Question: what is intentionality? (3) The What-Impact-Question: what is the lasting impact of Husserlian intentionality? Addressing these questions in turn, I first argue that in contrast to Brentano’s descriptive psychological approach Husserl is primarily interested in a transcendentally (and ontologically) oriented account of consciousness according to which intentionality amounts to the fundamental structure in virtue of which existent (and non-existent) objects can manifest themselves to us in the first place. Turning to the second question, I briefly describe what I call the “fourfold essence” of Husserlian intentionality. Accordingly, intentionality is a multidimensional property of (most) conscious experiences that exhibits four mutually irreducible and equally indispensable “axes” (subject; noetic mode or “quality”; noematic sense or “matter”; and intentional object). In this context, I also discuss Husserl’s notion of “horizon” and hint at an integrative interpretation that tries to combine Husserl’s early species theory of content with his later noematic theory. In the third part, I defend Husserlian intentionality against Hilary Putnam’s influential charge of an allegedly “magical” connection between mind and world. I conclude that Husserlian intentionality manifests the deep metaphysical fact that, essentially speaking, mind and world are made for each other: the essence of consciousness points towards the world, and the essence of the world prescribes possible ways of experiencing it.
