ABSTRACT
While embodiment is crucial for Husserl’s theory of perception and empathy, it is also the beating heart of his transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, there is neither a purely formal transcendental ego, nor pure forms of intuition. Transcendental subjectivity must necessarily be embodied to make (spatially and temporally concordant) experience possible and thereby guarantee an objective perception of the world and others. This article will discuss three dimensions of normality and objectivity as embodied space. It will start by introducing the double constitution of the body as Leib-Körper, which defines the primordial spatiality of embodiment. It will then highlight the general necessity of a sensing and moving body for the constitution of space and a concordant and optimal disclosure of the world. The third part explains embodiment in terms of concrete subjectivity, hence articulating the relevance of the body for habitually inhabiting the world and for developing a personal identity. Embodiment, as I will argue, must first be understood as a general transcendental condition of every possible experience and objectivity. Second, it must be understood as a genetic condition of individual (and intersubjective) experience, that is, as concrete a priori.
